ForASec: Formal Analysis of Security Vulnerabilities in Sequential
  Circuits by Khalid, Faiq et al.
1ForASec: Formal Analysis of Security
Vulnerabilities in Sequential Circuits
Faiq Khalid, Student Member, IEEE, Imran Hafeez Abbassi, Semeen Rehman, Member, IEEE ,
Osman Hasan, Senior Member, IEEE and Muhammad Shafique, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Security vulnerability analysis of Integrated Circuits using conventional design-time validation and verification techniques is
generally a computationally intensive task and incomplete by nature, under limited resources and time. To overcome this limitation, we
propose a novel methodology based on model checking to formally analyze security vulnerabilities in sequential circuits considering
side-channel parameters like propagation delay, switching and leakage power. In particular, we present a novel algorithm to efficiently
partition the state-space into corresponding smaller state-spaces for faster security analysis of complex sequential circuits and thereby
mitigating the associated state-space explosion due to their feedback loops. We analyze multiple ISCAS89 and trust-hub benchmarks
to demonstrate the efficacy of our framework in identifying security vulnerabilities.
Index Terms—Formal Verification, Hardware Trojan, Model Checking,
F
1 INTRODUCTION
The increasing trend of outsourcing fabrication and split
manufacturing to untrusted foundries and manufacturing
plants has imposed significant threats to the security of
critical applications [1]. In Hardware Trojan (HT) insertion
attacks, an IC design is covertly altered with a malicious
intent at some point during the design or manufacturing
process [2]. HTs, may lead to three types of security attacks:
(1) leakage of confidential information (confidentiality attack);
(2) modifying the specifications or functionality (integrity
attack); and (3) reduced reliability, degraded performance
and destruction of a complete IC or its module (availability
attack), as shown in Fig. 1. The effects can be catastrophic,
such as system failure, and leakage of secret encryption
keys, making it imperative to develop effective HT detection
techniques, e.g., failure of ice-detection module in the P-8A
Poseidon [3], [4]).
Fig. 1. Working Principle of Hardware Trojans
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Typically, HT detection techniques employ propagation
delay [5], [6] and power [7], [8], [9] signature based analyses,
which inherently pose the following limitations:
1) These techniques are based on extensive simulations or
testing on real hardware systems, which require immense
amount of time, cost and resources (as shown in Fig.2),
and therefore cannot provide full coverage for larger
circuits. For example, in Fig. 2, the circuit F (ISCAS S349)
requires 51.2 seconds to test all input cases, i.e., 29 = 512
(because total number of inputs are “9”), but to analyze
the security vulnerabilities for all the possible gates (349)
and nodes (369), it requires almost 3.18 × 1096 years
and 3.64 × 10102 years, if 10 tests are performed in second,
respectively. Moreover, with an increase in the number of
inputs, even security vulnerability analysis with respect
to input patterns is not feasible. For example, it requires
almost 109 years to perform the security vulnerability
analysis for circuit H (ISCAS S349) with respect to all pos-
sible input patterns, i.e., 235 = 34, 359, 738, 368 (because
total number of inputs are “35”).
2) The measurements acquired through sensors cannot en-
compass all the possible input conditions for larger ICs
because of inherent data loss during the quantization in
analog-to-digital conversion [10].
To address the above problem of high demand on the
resources and the time of analysis during the design
phase, different analytical techniques for vulnerability assess-
ment against potential attacks have been developed. These
techniques analyze the equivalent behavioral, functional
and performance model against the design constraints and
functionality characteristics [11], [12], [13], [14], [15]. These
model-based simulations cannot guarantee complete cover-
age because of the computational constraints (energy and
memory) [16] and floating point inaccuracies [17]. To ad-
dress these issues, mathematical modeling and formal verifi-
cation [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [28],
(i.e., SAT solvers and model checking), based approaches
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Fig. 2. Required number of patterns and time for 100% coverage for security vulnerability analysis (functional) in different sequential circuits (DFF,
8-bit shift register, 8-bit counter and some of the ISCAS89 benchmarks, i.e., s27, s298, s349, s35932, s38417 and s35854). Note: All the values
are at “Logarithmic scale”.
provides the completeness and accuracy to some extent.
However, these techniques deploy symbolic execution or
fixed approximation of side-channel parameters. Therefore,
they are unable to incorporate the parametric behavior,
especially, leakage power, and effects of process variations,
which limits their scope to Active Hardware Trojans (AHTs,
that remain active even under the normal operation).
1.1 Associated Research Challenges:
The aforementioned limitations of simulation-based, model-
based and formal verification-based techniques pose the
following research challenges:
1) Accuracy: How to incorporate the parametric behavior and
effects of process variations to ensure an accurate security
vulnerability analysis, even in the presence of Stealthy
Hardware Trojans (SHTs, that remain inactive until they
receive any activation trigger)?
2) Completeness: How to ensure 100% coverage in security
vulnerability analysis for all gates and nodes with all
possible input patterns?
3) Feasibility: How to reduce the analysis time while keeping
100% coverage for all gates and nodes with all possible
input patterns?
1.2 Our Novel Contribution
To address these research challenges, we propose a novel
and generic framework for formal analysis of security vul-
nerabilities (ForASec, Section 4) to perform the security
analysis while considering the complete coverage of para-
metric behavior (i.e., leakage power, dynamic power and
propagation delay) and process variations. The proposed
ForASec consists of the following key components:
1) Mathematical modeling (Section 4.1) of basic gates, i.e.,
NOR, NAND and NOT, with respect to side-channel
parameters while considering the process variations ef-
fects on different technology parameters, e.g., switch on
resistance (Ron), oxide capacitance (tox), carrier mobili-
ties (µn and µp), gate (Cg), drain (Cd) and source (Cs)
capacitances.
2) Model checking based analysis methodology (Section
4.1) to ensure the complete coverage of security vulnera-
bility analysis, against the multiple intrusions at different
locations, for all gates, nodes and with respect to all input
patterns.
TABLE 1
Feature Comparison with State-of-the-Art
Methodology Targeted Attacks
ModelingRelatedWorks Simulation Math Formal SE AHT SHT
EC/PV
[14], [15] X X
[18] X X X
[19], [20], [21], [22], [23] X X X
[26], [27] X X
[24] X X X
[25] X X X
ForASec X X X X X X
3) A verification/analysis algorithm (Section 4.2) to ad-
dress the state-space explosion while considering the
uncertain behavior of side-channel parameters.
To evaluate the effectiveness of ForASec, we implement
some of the basic sequential circuits and ISCAS89 bench-
mark in the presence of trust-hub Trojan benchmarks [29],
[30], i.e., s35932-T100, s35932-T200, s35932-T300, s38417-
T100, s38417-T200, s38417-T300, s38584-T100, s38584-T200
and s38584-T300. The experimental results demonstrate that
ForASec is able to correctly identify the most vulnerable
node(s) and the minimum-possible size of SHTs that can be
detected while analyzing the leakage power. Moreover, it also
reduces the analysis time by 5 to 20 times (See Section 5.3).
2 RELATED WORK
Typically, model based simulations are used for analyzing the
security vulnerabilities [14], [15], but they cannot cover all
possible test cases in complex systems because of their
computational constraints (energy and memory) [16] and
floating point inaccuracies [17]. To ensure the completeness
and accuracy, mathematical modeling and formal verification
based vulnerability analysis techniques have been proposed
[18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], as shown in
Table 1. Although, to some extent, mathematical modeling
can overcome above-mentioned limitations, it is still prone
to human error and increases the design time. On the other
hand, formal verification based approaches, i.e., SAT solving and
model checking, can overcome the above stated limitations
of simulation-based techniques by virtue of their inherent
soundness and completeness [28].
The SAT solver based approaches are used for multi-
stage assertion-based verification, code coverage analysis,
3redundant circuit removal for isolation of suspicious sig-
nals and sequential automatic test pattern generations in
vulnerability analysis [18], [19]. However, they provide the
information about the satisfaction of certain property but in
case of failure they are unable to identify the reason, thus
lack completeness in vulnerability analysis [31].
On the other hand, functional [20], [21], [22] and behav-
ioral [23] model checking based approaches provide the compre-
hensive vulnerability analysis and cover all possible input
test cases but they inherently pose the state-space explosion
problem for complex systems. To overcome this issue, several
approaches for performance modeling have been proposed,
which model the side-channel parameters, i.e., power [24],
[25], [26], propagation delay [25], [26] and temperature [27],
and analyze the vulnerabilities based on temporal prop-
erties [25], [26], [27] and property specification language
[24]. These approaches provide the symbolic execution or
fixed approximation of side-channel parameters. Therefore,
they only target the security vulnerabilities against Active
Hardware Trojans and may not be able to analyze the
security vulnerabilities due to Stealthy Hardware Trojans
(SHT). These SHTs remain undetected and inactive during
the testing phase and even after deployment using external,
internal or time-based triggers, they can initiate any of the
drastic payloads as mentioned in Fig. 3. Symbolic side-
channel parameters of these approaches makes the trans-
lated model deterministic, thus overshadows the uncertain
behavior due to process variations. Moreover, most of these
approaches are focused on the cryptographic modules but
other modules can also be affected to launch Denial-of-
Service attacks (DoS) or to disable the system. For instance,
in Fig. 3, the control signals of HT-1, 2, 4 and 5 can be
used for DoS attacks, as a kill switch or for controlling
the computation and communication. These attacks can
activate their respective payload even if they are not directly
affecting the cryptographic components.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide a brief overview of different
triggering mechanisms and payload of HTs, gate-level mod-
eling and model checking.
3.1 Triggers and Payloads of HTs
Fig. 3 shows different types of triggering and payload
mechanisms for hardware Trojans, e.g., the payload of HTs
1, 2, 4 and 5 is to hack the signals C and ER, which can
be any control signal having the combinational, sequential
(counter), asynchronous (counter) and hybrid triggering
mechanism, respectively. However, payload of Trojan 3 is
to leak the information via side-channel parameters which
in this case is dynamic or leakage power. Therefore, HTs
can broadly be categorized as: (1) Functional HTs, which
change the system functionality by addition or deletion
of modules with malicious intent and (2) Parametric HTs,
which reduce reliability, increase the likelihood of system
failure, and modify the physical parameters, such as power
consumption and resulting in faster aging than expected.
Trojan 1: Combinational  
Trigger: Combinational Trigger (Internal)
Payload: Modification of Control Signal C
A
B
C
C*
Trigger
Payload
Trojan 2: Sequential
Trigger: Sequential Trigger (Internal)
Payload: Modification of Enable Reset Signal ER
TriggerCLK
ER
ER*
Payload
1
2
k
Trojan 3: Asynchronous
Trigger: Combinational Trigger (External)
Payload: Modification of Enable Reset Signal ER
Trigger
ER
ER*
Payload
1
2
kp
q
Trojan 5: Hybrid of Trojans 1, 2 and 3
Trigger: Combinational and Sequential Trigger (External)
Payload: Modification of Enable Reset Signal ER
Trigger
ER
ER*
Payload
K2-bit 
Counter
K1-bit 
Counter
CLK p
q
Trojan 4: Side Channel
Trigger: Always ON/Power Fluctuation
Payload: Key Leakage
Crypto
Module
+
Key Bus
+
PRNG
MOLES
𝒓𝑘0(𝑡)
𝑲0 𝑲0⊕𝒓𝑘0(𝑡)
𝑷0→1(𝑡)
Fig. 3. Triggering and payload mechanisms of HTs
3.2 Model Checking and nuXmv
Model checking [32] is primarily used as a verification
technique for reactive systems by translating them into a
corresponding state-space model and temporal properties.
Although it provides automatic and exhaustive verification
but in complex systems the state-space grows exponentially,
which makes it computationally impossible to explore the
entire state-space with limited resources. This problem,
termed as state-space explosion, is usually resolved by
using efficient algorithms and bounded model checking
(BMC) [32]. In this paper, we use an open-source symbolic
model checker, nuXmv [33], supports rational number anal-
ysis and property language specification using computation
tree and linear temporal logic, to facilitate the modeling and
verification of designs that exhibit continuous behaviors.
3.3 Gate-Level Performance Parameters
In this paper, we employ the following multiple side-
channel parameters for gate level modeling of complex
sequential circuits:
Dynamic Power is the power dissipated while
(dis)charging of load capacitances associated with
transistors, nodes and wires and usually modeled as
Pswitching = α.Ctotal .Vdd
2 .f , where α, f , Vdd , Ctotal are
the switching activity, operating clock frequency, supply
voltage, and the total capacitance that is (dis)charged in a
transition, respectively.
Subthreshold Leakage Power is dissipated in an IC pri-
marily due to the undesirable flow of subthreshold cur-
rent in the channel from Vdd to ground nodes, when
transistors are in Off state. In this paper, we modeled
it as PLeakage = Vdd .ILeakage . Equation 1 shows the sub-
threshold leakage current of a MOSFET per transistor width,
where W is gate width, L is the effective channel length,
n is subthreshold slope factor, Cox is oxide capacitance,
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Fig. 4. Our ForASec Framework for Formal Vulnerability Assessment of Sequential Circuits
φt = KT/q is thermal voltage, µ is effective carrier mobility,
and σ is drain induced barrier lowering (DIBL) factor.
ILeakage = 2 .n.µ.Cox .
W
L
.φt
2 .exp(
σ.Vdd −Vth
n.φt
) (1)
Propagation Delay is defined as the (dis)charging time of
the internal parasitic and external load capacitances, it is
estimated as Elmore delay based on individual input transi-
tions tdelay = ln 2 .τelmore , where τ is equivalent to the first-
order time constant τelmore =
∑N
k=1 Rik .Ck , where Ck is the
capacitance at node k , and Rik is shared resistance among
the paths from root to node k and leaf i .
4 FORASEC: ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
ForASec analyzes the security vulnerabilities in a sequential
circuit by translating it into its corresponding state-space
model. Fig. 4 shows the different phases of vulnerability
assessment in the proposed framework, which are explained
below in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
4.1 State-Space Modeling and Translation
In the first phase, ForASec translates the circuits un-
der test into their corresponding state-space and behav-
ioral/functional/performance properties (see Fig. 4). For
this translation, we developed the side-channel and technol-
ogy parameters-based models for all the universal 2-input
gates, i.e., NAND, NOR and NOT, that are used to model
the multi-input complex gates and modules. For illustration
purposes, we describe the two input NAND gate model
with different parameter values based on their transistor
level structure, shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. Modeling of 2-Input NAND Gate
Dynamic power for 2-input NAND is modeled as
Pswitch = α.Ctotal .Vdd
2 .f , where switching activity (α), is com-
puted based on the input/output transition probability
and the total capacitance at the output of NAND is
equal to Ctotal = Cload + Cdiff . The load capacitance (Cload )
at the output of a single gate is the sum of gate ca-
pacitances of individual gates connected at the output
node (Cload =
p∑
i=1
CgpMOSi +
n∑
j=1
CgnMOSj ). However, the gate
capacitance for an individual pMOS/nMOS transistor is
CgMOS = FO .WR.(CGSO + CGDO +Wmin .L.Cox ), where
FO , WR, CGDO , CGSO , Wmin , L and Cox represent fanout,
width ratio, overlap capacitances, minimum width, effective
length, and oxide capacitance per unit area of the gate,
respectively.
The internal diffusion capacitance (Cdiff ) depends
on both the sidewall perimeter PS and area AS of
the source (drain) diffusion region and modeled as
5Fig. 6. Modeling of a 2-Input NAND Gate with intrusion
Cdiff =
(
2 .FO .WRp .Wpmin .Cpdmin
)
+
(
FO .WRn .Wnmin .Cndmin
)
,
where Cpdmin and Cndmin represent the minimum
intrinsic capacitance for the pMOS and nMOS
transistors, respectively. The minimum drain diffusion
capacitance (Cdmin ) for a single transistor is calculated
as Cdmin = AS .Cjbd + PS .Cjbsdw , where Cjbd is the
capacitance per unit area between body and bottom of the
drain, and Cjbsdw is the capacitance per unit length of the
junction between body and side walls of the drain. Similarly,
the minimum source diffusion capacitance (Csmin ) can be
computed as well.
We have modeled the propagation delay as Elmore’s delay
estimation because it considers the linear behavior of tran-
sistors to incorporate the effects of process variations. It is
defined as the time required for charging and discharging
the total capacitances via RC tree path from drain to source.
This resistive behavior of the transistors is modeled as
Ron =
L
µ.Cox .W .(Vgs−Vth) . We have modeled the resistances
for individual pMOS and nMOS transistors in accordance
with the configuration of universal gates on different inputs.
Table 3 indicates the Elmore delay relation for 6 possible
transitions.
We have modeled the leakage current at the gate level
using the components mentioned in Equation 1. The total
leakage in an IC is the sum of leakage power of individual
nMOS and pMOS transistors that are in the Off state, which
essentially depends on the input vector. In CMOS based ICs,
half of the total transistors are always in the Off state for any
given vector. The stacking of two Off transistors in series
significantly reduces the sub-threshold leakage compared
to a single Off transistor. The two nMOS transistors in the
NAND gate, shown in Fig. 5, are in series and as a result of
the stack effect on input vector 00, the total leakage current
reduces by a factor 10
−(Vdd .σ)
n by virtue of Kirchhoff’s cur-
rent law. The leakage power for the two input NAND gates
can be modeled with respect to the input states as shown in
Table 2.
In case of intrusion at the output of any gate, the to-
tal capacitance (Ctotal) of the gate can increase with the
factor Cint, which is the gate capacitance of the intruded
gates (Cint = Cint1 + Cint2 + ...+ Cintn ). Thus, the total
capacitance Ctotal at the output of the gate is changed to
Ctotal = Cload + Cdiffusion + Cint . This increase in capaci-
tance can affect the overall performance of the gate in terms
of side-channel parameters. For example, if the intruded
Algorithm 1 : Security Vulnerability Analysis
Input:Maximum dynamic power (DPmax ) and leakage
power LPmax , Minimum leakage power (LPmin ) and Max-
imum delays for k paths of IC (d1max ..dkmax ) .
Output: Vulnerable locations
1: while Property I = TRUE do // upper bound of dynamic
power
2: Generate counterexample using Property II;
3: Add counterexample as an exception;
4: end while
5: while Property IV = TRUE do // upper bound of propaga-
tion delay
6: Generate counterexample using Property V;
7: Add counterexample as an exception;
8: end while
9: while Property VI = TRUE do // upper/lower bound of
leakage power
10: Generate counterexample using Property VII;
11: Add counterexample as an exception;
12: end while
gate is within the propagation path then it has a major effect
on the propagation delay and dynamic power, otherwise its
effect is more on switching and leakage power compared to
propagation delay.
4.2 Verification and Vulnerability Analysis
In the second phase, ForASec verifies the translated model
and intrudes it to analyze the vulnerable locations (see
Fig. 4). First, the functional, behavior and performance
tests are performed to ensure the correctness of the trans-
lated model. We assume that an attacker has access to the
netlist, therefore, to model this behavior, a different number
of intruded gates are applied at different locations in the model
to generate counterexamples for the given functionality,
behavior and performance. These counterexamples are used
to analyze and identify the vulnerabilities for undesired
behavior, caused due to malicious alterations.
We propose a generic set of functional, behavioral and
performance properties, based on the circuit under test
(CUT), to analyze the vulnerabilities against intrusions
based on the performance bounds of the circuits, which are
calculated by applying different distributions of technology
parameters. It is important to note that the lower bounds for
dynamic power and path delays are not considered because
these values are always zero in the steady state condition.
The above-mentioned bounds are computed under the fol-
lowing definitions:
1) The upper bound of dynamic power is modeled as∑n
i=1 DPimax , where DPimax is the maximum dynamic
power of an ith gate.
2) The upper bound of the delay of the k th path is modeled
as
∑m
i=1 Delayimax , where Delayimax is the maximum
delay of the ith gate in the selected path.
3) The upper/lower bound of leakage power is modeled
as
∑n
i=1 LPimax/imin , where LPimax/imin is the max-
imum/minimum leakage power dissipated by the ith
gate.
Algorithm for Security Vulnerability Analysis: it an-
alyzes the state-space model of the given circuit and gen-
erates the corresponding counterexamples using the set of
6TABLE 2
Leakage Power modeling of a 2-Input NAND Gate
State Subthreshold Leakage Power
00 2.FO.Vdd.
(
nn.µn.Cox.WRn.
Wnmin
Ln
.φt
2.exp(σn.Vdd−Vthn
nn.φt
)
)
.10
−(Vdd.σn)
nn
01 2.FO.Vdd.
(
nn.µn.Cox.WRn.
Wnmin
Ln
.φt
2.exp(σn.Vdd−Vthn
nn.φt
) + np.µp.Cox.WRp.
Wpmin
Lp
.φt
2.exp(
σp.Vdd−Vthp
np.φt
)
)
10 2.FO.Vdd.
(
nn.µn.Cox.WRn.
Wnmin
Ln
.φt
2.exp(σn.Vdd−Vthn
nn.φt
) + np.µp.Cox.WRp.
Wpmin
Lp
.φt
2.exp(
σp.Vdd−Vthp
np.φt
)
)
11 4.FO.Vdd.
(
np.µp.Cox.WRp.
Wpmin
Lp
.φt
2.exp(
σp.Vdd−Vthp
np.φt
)
)
TABLE 3
Propagation Delay Modeling of 2-Input NAND Gate
I/P Transition O/P Transition Elmore Delay (τ )
01→ 11 1→ 0 2.Rn.Ctotal/FO.WRn
10→ 11 1→ 0 2.Rn.(Ctotal + Cnstack)/FO.WRn
00→ 11 1→ 0 2.Rn.Ctotal/FO.WRn
11→ 01 0→ 1 Rp.Ctotal/FO.WRp
11→ 00 0→ 1 Rp.Ctotal/2.FO.WRp
11→ 10 0→ 1 Rp.(Ctotal + Cnstack)/FO.WRp
linear temporal logical (LTL) properties. These properties
are based on the upper and lower bound of side-channel
parameters, like propagation delay, dynamic and leakage
power. To capture the effect on dynamic power, we propose
property I which states that there exists a state in which
dynamic power is out of upper bound, which can be true
if any intrusion has a significant impact on dynamic power.
However, if the property is false then it indicates the sce-
nario in which either there is no intrusion in the IC or the
dynamic power fails to detect the HTs.
F (DP ! = 0→ DPMAX < DP1 +DP2 + ...+DPn) (I)
Once the unwanted behavior of intrusions is identified
(Property I holds), we take the complement of Property I,
to generate the error trace, as shown in Property II.
G(DP ! = 0→ DPMAX >= DP1 +DP2 + ...+DPn) (II)
The counterexample driven analysis is performed to identify
the vulnerable locations. After analyzing the counterexam-
ple, it is added as an exception in Property I to generate
Property III. This process repeats until the Property I be-
comes false, as shown in line 1 to 4.
F ((DP ! = 0)&(C1&..&Cn)→ DPMAX < DP1 + ...+DPn)
(III)
Similarly, this iterative process is applied on the following
set of LTL properties to analyze effects on the propagation
delay and leakage power.
F (D(k) ! = 0→ D(k)max < D1(k) + ...+Dn(k)) (IV)
G(D(k) ! = 0→ D(k)max >= D1(k) + ...+Dn(k)) (V)
F (LPmax/min < / > LP1 + LP2 + ...+ LPn) (VI)
G(LPmax/min >= / <= LP1 + LP2 + ...+ LPn) (VII)
TABLE 4
Effects of intrusion (1 NAND gate) at different locations within
computational paths on leakage power
Circuits I/P O/P IntermediateCP NCP
DFF 25.34% 31.93% 17.99% 30.53%
8-bit Shift Register 5.08% 6.40% 3.61% 4.11%
8-bit Counter 4.60% 5.80% 3.27% 3.73%
ISCAS S27 6.00% 7.56% 4.26% 4.86%
ISCAS S298 2.00% 2.52% 1.42% 1.62%
ISCAS S344 1.12% 1.41% 0.80% 0.91%
ISCAS S349 0.60% 0.76% 0.43% 0.49%
For complex and larger circuits, the number of variables in
the model along with the individual gates increases, which
augments the complexity, and thus the above-mentioned
counterexample analysis may take a longer time. However,
the proposed algorithm and the modular structure of gate models
reduces the complexity by allowing to construct and analyze the
dynamic power, leakage power and delay models separately.
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
To illustrate the practicability and usefulness of our ForASec
framework, we evaluate it on a set of ISCAS89 benchmarks
and some basic sequential circuits, like D-Flipflop (DFF),
Shift register and counter, with intruded gates (Table 4) and
trust-hub Trojan benchmarks. The following tools are used
for experimentation:
1) Yosys for gate level translation of provided netlist or
verilog code [34].
2) verilog2smv for gate level translation to corresponding
smv mode [35].
3) nuXmv Version 1.1.1 for model checking and performance
analysis.
All the simulations are executed in Centos 7 on a com-
puting machine with Core i7 processor @3.4 GHz and 16 GB
memory. For each benchmark, we consider two cases:
1) Case 1: the malicious gates are inserted randomly along
the IC paths at the input, output and within critical and
non critical paths.
2) Case 2: the malicious gates are inserted parallel to the IC
paths.
As an example, Table 4 shows the variations in leakage
power caused by single gate intrusion in benchmark circuits.
To analyze the multiple counterexamples that either can
be generated by single or multiple intrusions, we used the
iterative Algorithm 1.
7Fig. 7. Some Examples of Implemented Intrusions in parallel to compu-
tational path at different locations of DFF
5.1 Modeling and Analysis of Benchmark Circuits
The ForASec analysis of the implemented circuits is per-
formed in two steps: (1) accuracy analysis of model trans-
lation and (2) vulnerability analysis against multiple intru-
sions. The correctness of the translated model is ensured
by verifying all the functional, behavioral and performance
characteristics.
For example, in Fig. 7, CLK-to-Q delay of a DFF is
equivalent to the combined delay of NAND1 and NAND3,
hold time of a DFF is equivalent to the inverters, delay and
the setup time of DFF is equivalent to the combined delay
of NAND3 and NAND4. Similarly, the dynamic power,
functionality and other characteristics are well defined in
the literature. Therefore, to ensure the accuracy of model
translation, the translated model of DFF must fulfill all the
above-mentioned properties, design constraints and charac-
teristics. Similarly, we translated multiple ISCAS89 bench-
marks along with basic sequential circuits, i.e., a DFF, shift
registers and counters, into their respective SMV models
and verified them based on the above-mentioned properties,
design constraints and characteristics.
5.2 Security Vulnerability Analysis of Benchmark Cir-
cuits:
Once the accuracy is ensured, then vulnerability of the
translated model is analyzed by applying effects of multiple
intrusions. For instance, Fig. 7 shows multiple parallel intru-
sions in a DFF, which can affect the side-channel parameters
due to the loading effect.
We evaluated basic sequential circuits and ISCAS89
benchmarks against single/multiple gate intrusions and
trust-hub Trojan benchmarks, i.e., s35932-T100, s35932-
T200, s35932-T300, s38417-T100, s38417-T200, s38417-T300,
s38584-T100, s38584-T200 and s38584-T300. Due to space lim-
itation, it is not possible to discuss the vulnerable point in all cir-
cuits, therefore, in this section, the analysis of DFF and ISCAS89
benchmarks, i.e., s349, s35932, s38417 and s35854, against
single/multiple gate intrusions and trust-hub Trojan benchmarks,
is presented as these are some the most complex circuits among the
implemented ones. Table 5 shows the structural information of
the implemented benchmarks.
TABLE 5
Structural Information of the ISCAS89 Benchmarks
Benchmarks Inputs Outputs Gates Flip-flopsNANDs NORs NOTs
s349 9 11 63 41 179 15
s35932 35 320 11052 1152 9045 1728
s38417 28 106 6204 2505 17850 1636
s38584 12 278 7642 3806 15933 1452
5.2.1 D flip-flop (DFF) against gate intrusions
We intruded at multiple locations, i.e, feedback
paths/nodes, input nodes, output nodes and intermediate
paths/nodes, as shown in Fig. 7. The feedback node in DFF
is more vulnerable compared to other positions because of
higher switching activity, which makes this node slightly
unstable and lass vulnerable with respect to intrusion.
Moreover, the change in the loading effect of the feedback
node can cause the setup time violation, which may result
in data corruption.
5.2.2 ISCAS89 benchmark S349 against gate intrusions
For the vulnerability analysis, we intruded the S349 at mul-
tiple locations with different size (the number of intruded
gates). Fig. 8 shows the effects of intrusion on the side-
channel parameters but these variations can be overshad-
owed by the effects of process variations. Therefore, before
intruding the circuits, we analyzed the effects of process
variations, shown in Fig. 8 and analyzed their combined
effects, which exhibit the following key observations:
1) The effect on dynamic power due to the process varia-
tions overshadows the effects of intrusions if the Trojan
size is less than or equal to 7 gates (i.e., 2% of S349),
as shown in Fig. 8(a) (see label DP1). However, beyond
that the effects of intrusions are dominant and varies
at different locations. For example, the dynamic power
is affected by almost 11%, when 10 gates are intruded
within the critical path. However, it is affected by almost
5%, when 10 gates are intruded at the input locations. The
reason behind this behavior is that, in S349, there are no
DFFs at the input,but the intrusion at intermediate stages
involves effects in the feedback path of DFF, which starts
the unwanted switching activity. Similar behavior can be
observed in case of parallel gate intrusion (see label DP2).
2) The effect on leakage power due to the process varia-
tions overshadows the effects of intrusions if the Trojan
size is less than or equal to 9 gates (2.5% of S349),
as shown in Fig. 8(b) (see labels LP1 and LP2). The
reason behind this behavior is that most of the physical
parameters are affected by the process variations.
3) The effect on leakage power due to gate intrusions is
very dominant, especially, when the intrusions are within
the path, as shown in Fig. 8(c) (see label PD1). However,
if intrusions are in parallel then the effect remains within
the range of the process variations till the intrusion size
is 6, as shown in Fig. 8(c) (see label PD2).
As a consequence, it can be concluded that input nodes are
the most vulnerable point in the sequential circuits because the
effects of such intrusions can be overshadowed by process
variations, except for DFF in which the most vulnerable
points are feedback nodes.
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5.2.3 ISCAS89 benchmark against the trust-hub Trojan
benchmarks
In order to evaluate the robustness and scalability of
ForASec, we analyzed three of the most complicated IS-
CAS89 benchmarks, i.e., s35932, s38417 and s38584, against
the trust-hub benchmarks and identify their respective vul-
nerabilities that exhibits the following key observations.
1) Dynamic power analysis: The effects of all Trojan bench-
marks in s35932, are significant even in the presence of
process variation, except s35932-T100, as shown in Fig. 9
(See label 1). Similarly, the Trojan benchmarks for s35854,
the of Trojan benchmarks s38584-T200 and s38584-T300
are overshadowed by the effects of process variations,
as shown in Fig. 9 (See label 2). The reason behind this
behavior is that, these Trojans operate in parallel and
do not change the activity on any node of the circuit.
Thus, s35932-T100, s38584-T200 and s38584-T300 can be
considered as powerful attacks for dynamic power-based
detection schemes.
2) Leakage power analysis: Almost all the Trojan bench-
marks have a significant impact on the leakage power,
except s35932-T200, as shown in Fig. 9 (See label 3).
The reason behind this behavior is that the size of this
Trojan is very small (15 gates, 0.04% of s35932). However,
when it gets activated, it increases the switching activity
and reduces the delay by creating a parallel path to
skip four gates. Therefore, it has a significant impact
on the dynamic power and the propagation delay, as
shown in Fig. 9. In short, this Trojan (s35932-T200), can
be considered as the powerful attack for leakage power-
based detection schemes.
3) Propagation delay analysis: Process variations over-
shadow the effects of almost all the Trojans, as shown
in Fig. 9 (See labels 4 and 5). The reason behind this
behavior is that all these Trojans are inserted in parallel
to the computational paths. However, s35932-T200 and
S38417-T200 exhibit significant impact on propagation
delay. In short, these Trojans (s35932-T200 and S38417-
T200) are the weak attacks for propagation delay-based
detection schemes.
5.3 Performance Analysis
Algorithm 1 generates a number of counterexamples during
the vulnerability analysis of an IC depending upon intruded
gates, their size and locations. Moreover, the time required
by the nuXmv model checker to generate a single coun-
terexample depends on the number of gates in an IC, i.e.,
size of the state-space model. Table 6 shows the number
of counterexamples (CE), their analysis time (T) in seconds
(s), and memory (M) acquired in gigabytes (GB) for the
8 NAND gates intrusion (within a computational path)
in the ISCAS89 benchmark S349. It shows that with our
proposed algorithm, the analysis time and required memory
is exponentially reduced.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel formal framework
(ForASec), based on the side-channel parameter analysis,
9TABLE 6
Performance Comparison with respect to Analysis Time (T(s)) and
required Memory(M(GB)) for 8 gates intrusion (with computational
path) in S349, ISCAS89 benchmark
Parameter Location # of CEs
Without Algorithm 1 With Algorithm 1
T(s) M(GB) T(s) M(GB)
Switching
Power
Input 221 39579 16 2465 16
Output 304 47978 16 2978 16
CP 121 21642 16 741 13.94
NCP 102 17452 16 548 12.7
Leakage
Power
Input 29 4521 16 236 8.02
Output 31 4684 16 304 8.01
CP 179 32574 16 1079 15.17
NCP 164 301677 16 992 14.9
Propagation
Delay
Input 269 44579 16 3117 16
Output 356 55897 16 3658 16
CP 124 23591 16 987 13.8
NCP 103 18694 16 754 12.74
to analyze/identify the vulnerabilities in sequential circuits
against multiple types of intrusions at different locations
while considering the effects of process variations on tech-
nology parameters. For illustration, the proposed method-
ology has been applied on multiple ISCAS89 benchmarks
and standard sequential circuits. The experimental results
show that unlike existing techniques, it successfully identi-
fies operational boundaries and vulnerable nodes, i.e., due
to EC/PV the change i power is 2 to 5%, which must
be considered while designing. The feedback nodes in a
DFF are the vulnerable towards the side-channel attacks.
Another key outcome is the number of gates required by an
HT that can go undetected for a given design and variability
conditions.
REFERENCES
[1] H. Li et.al., “A survey of hardware trojan threat and defense,”
Integration, the VLSI Journal, vol. 55, pp. 426–437, 2016.
[2] S. Bhunia et.al., “Hardware Trojan Attacks: Threat Analysis and
Countermeasures,” vol. 102, no. 8. IEEE, 2014, pp. 1229–1247.
[3] J. Villasenor and M. Tehranipoor, “The hidden dangers of chop-
shop electronics: Clever counterfeiters sell old components as
new threatening both military and commercial systems,” IEEE
Spectrum (cover story), 2013.
[4] S. Adee, “The Hunt for the Kill Switch,” IEEE Spectrum, vol. 45,
no. 5, pp. 34–39, 2008.
[5] D. Ismari et.al., “On detecting delay anomalies introduced by
hardware trojans,” in ICCD. IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–7.
[6] G. Zarrinchian et.al., “Latch-based structure: A high resolution
and self-reference technique for hardware trojan detection,” Trans.
C, vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 100–113, 2017.
[7] F. K. Lodhi et.al., “Power profiling of microcontroller’s instruction
set for runtime hardware trojans detection without golden circuit
models,” in DATE. IEEE, 2017, pp. 294–297.
[8] T. Hoque et.al., “Golden-free hardware trojan detection with high
sensitivity under process noise,” JETTA, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 107–124,
2017.
[9] F. K. Lodhi et.al., “A Self-Learning Framework to Detect the
Intruded Integrated Circuits,” in ISCAS. IEEE, 2016, pp. 1702–
1705.
[10] M. Pelgrom, “Nyquist analog-to-digital conversion,” in Analog-to-
Digital Conversion. Springer, 2017, pp. 285–403.
[11] R. S. Chakraborty, S. Pagliarini, J. Mathew, S. R. Rajendran, and
M. N. Devi, “A flexible online checking technique to enhance
hardware trojan horse detectability by reliability analysis,” IEEE
Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 260–
270, 2017.
[12] S. P. Mohanty, A. Srivastava, S. Hu, and P. Ghosal, “Guest
editorial–special issue on hardware assisted techniques for iot and
bigdata applications,” 2017.
[13] R. Rad et al., “Sensitivity analysis to hardware trojans using power
supply transient signals,” in Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust,
2008. HOST 2008. IEEE International Workshop on. IEEE, 2008, pp.
3–7.
[14] P. Mishra et.al., “Security and trust vulnerabilities in third-party
ips,” in Hardware IP Security and Trust. Springer, 2017, pp. 3–14.
[15] G. K. Contreras et.al., “Security vulnerability analysis of design-
for-test exploits for asset protection in socs,” in ASP-DAC. IEEE,
2017, pp. 617–622.
[16] O. Balci, “Verification validation and accreditation of simulation
models,” in CWS. IEEE Computer Society, 1997, pp. 135–141.
[17] E. et.al., “Design of embedded systems: Formal models, valida-
tion, and synthesis,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 85, no. 3, pp.
366–390, 1997.
[18] X. Zhang et.al., “Detecting Hardware Trojans in Third-Party Digi-
tal IP Cores,” in HOST. IEEE, 2011, pp. 67–70.
[19] L. Feiten et.al., “Formal vulnerability analysis of security compo-
nents,” Trans. CAD, vol. 34, no. 8, pp. 1358–1369, 2015.
[20] M. Rathmair et.al., “Hardware Trojan Detection by Specifying
Malicious Circuit Properties,” in EIEC. IEEE, 2013, pp. 317–320.
[21] F. K. Lodhi et.al., “Formal Analysis of Macro Synchronous Micro
Asychronous Pipeline for Hardware Trojan Detection,” in NorCAS.
IEEE, 2015, pp. 1–4.
[22] A. Nahiyan et.al., “Avfsm: a framework for identifying and miti-
gating vulnerabilities in fsms,” in DAC. IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–6.
[23] S. R. Hasan et.al., “Translating Circuit Behavior Manifestations of
Hardware Trojans using Model Checkers into Run-Time Trojan
Detection Monitors,” in Asian-HOST. IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–6.
[24] N. Veeranna et.al., “Hardware trojan detection in behavioral intel-
lectual properties (ips) using property checking techniques,” Trans.
ETC, 2016.
[25] I. Abbasi et.al., “Formal Verification of Gate-Level Multiple Side
Channel Parameters to Detect Hardware Trojans,” in FTSCS.
Springer, 2016, pp. 75–92.
[26] C. S. Pasareanu et.al., “Multi-run side-channel analysis using
symbolic execution and max-smt,” in CSF. IEEE, 2016, pp. 387–
400.
[27] X. T. Ngo et.al., “Hardware Property Checker for Run-Time Hard-
ware Trojan Detection,” in Circuit Theory and Design, 2015. IEEE,
2015, pp. 1–4.
[28] R. Drechsler et.al., Advanced Formal Verification. Springer, 2004,
no. ISBN 9781402077210.
[29] H. Salmani, M. Tehranipoor, and R. Karri, “On design vulnera-
bility analysis and trust benchmarks development,” in Computer
Design (ICCD), 2013 IEEE 31st International Conference on. IEEE,
2013, pp. 471–474.
[30] B. Shakya, T. He, H. Salmani, D. Forte, S. Bhunia, and M. Tehra-
nipoor, “Benchmarking of hardware trojans and maliciously af-
fected circuits,” Journal of Hardware and Systems Security, vol. 1,
no. 1, pp. 85–102, 2017.
[31] F. S. Bao, C. Gutierrez, J. J. Charles-Blount, Y. Yan, and Y. Zhang,
“Accelerating boolean satisfiability (sat) solving by common sub-
clause elimination,” AI Review, pp. 1–15, 2017.
[32] O. Hasan et.al., “Formal verification methods,” Encyclopedia of
Information Science and Technology, IGI Global Pub, pp. 7162–7170,
2015.
[33] R. Cavada et.al., “The nuXmv Symbolic Model Checker,” in CAV,
ser. LNCS. Springer, 2014, vol. 8559, pp. 334–342.
[34] C. Wolf, “Yosys open synthesis suite,” 2016.
[35] A. Irfan, A. Cimatti, A. Griggio, M. Roveri, and R. Sebastiani, “Ver-
ilog2smv: A tool for word-level verification,” in Design, Automation
& Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE), 2016. IEEE, 2016,
pp. 1156–1159.
10
Faiq Khalid (S’18) received the M.S. degree in
electrical engineering and the B.E. degree in
electronics engineering from the National Uni-
versity of Sciences and Technology (NUST),
Pakistan, in 2016 and 2011, respectively. He
is currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree in hard-
ware security with Computer Architecture and
Robust, Energy-Efficient Technologies, Vienna
University of Technology, Austria. He was a Re-
search Assistant with the System Analysis and
Verification (SAVe) Lab, NUST School of Electri-
cal Engineering and Computer Sciences. His research interests include
formal analysis and verification of embedded systems, hardware design
security, design reliability of VLSI circuits, and machine learning. He
is a member of the Pakistan Engineering Council. He has received
the Quaid-e-Azam Gold Medal for his academic achievements, the
Best Researcher Award at the SAVe Lab in 2014, and the prestigious
Richard Newton Fellowship at DAC 2018. His research interests include
formal analysis and verification of embedded systems, hardware design
security, design reliability of VLSI circuits and machine learning.
Imran Hafeez Abbassi received his MS de-
gree in Information Security from the National
University of Sciences and Technology (NUST),
Pakistan in 2011. He is currently pursuing his
PhD degree in electrical engineering from the
same institute, with research focused on hard-
ware intrusion detection using parametric analy-
sis. His research interests include hardware se-
curity, cryptography, formal verification and em-
bedded system design. Mr. Abbassi is a member
of Pakistan Engineering Council. He is also an
awardee of PhD scholarship from Higher Education Commission.
Semeen Rehman (S11) received the PhD de-
gree in computer science from the Karlsruhe
Institute of Technology, Germany, in 2015. She
is a post-doc researcher with the TU Dres-
den, since 2015. From 2005 to 2007, she was
an information systems manager with Mardan
Surgical Centre Pvt. (Ltd.), Pakistan. Her cur-
rent research interests include cross-layer reli-
ability modeling and optimization covering var-
ious system layers like compiler and run-time
system, approximate computing and embedded
systems. She received the CODES+ISSS 2011 and 2015 Best Paper
Awards and several HiPEAC Paper Awards. She is a student member of
the IEEE.
Osman Hasan received the M.Eng. and Ph.D.
degrees from Concordia University, Montreal,
Canada, in 2001 and 2008, respectively. Cur-
rently, he is an Assistant Professor at the Na-
tional University of Science and Technology
(NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan. He is the founder
and director of System Analysis and Verifica-
tion (SAVe) Lab at NUST, which mainly focuses
on the design and formal verification of safety-
critical systems, including e-health and digital
systems. He has received several awards and
distinctions, including the Pakistan’s Higher Education Commission’s
Best University Teacher (2010) and Best Young Researcher Award
(2011) and the President’s gold medal for the best teacher of the
University from NUST in 2015. Dr. Hasan is a senior member of IEEE,
member of the ACM, Association for Automated Reasoning (AAR) and
the Pakistan Engineering Council.
Muhammad Shafique (M11 - SM16) received
the Ph.D. degree in computer science from the
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Ger-
many, in 2011. He was a Senior Research Group
Leader with KIT for over five years. He was with
Streaming Networks Pvt. Ltd., where he was
involved in research and development of ad-
vanced video coding systems for several years.
He is currently a Full Professor with the Institute
of Computer Engineering, Department of Infor-
matics, Vienna University of Technology, Austria.
He is also directing the group on Computer Architecture and Robust,
Energy-Efficient Technologies.
His research interests are in computer architecture, power- and en-
ergy efficient systems, robust computing covering various aspects of
dependability and fault tolerance, hardware security, emerging comput-
ing trends, such as neuromorphic and approximate computing, neuro-
sciences, emerging technologies, and nanosystems, self-learning and
intelligent/cognitive systems, FPGAs, MPSoCs, and embedded sys-
tems. His research has a special focus on cross-layer analysis, mod-
eling, design, and optimization of computing and memory systems
covering various layers of the hardware and software stacks, as well as
their integration in application use cases from Internet-ofThings, Cyber-
Physical Systems, and ICT for Development domains.
He holds one U.S. patent and over 180 papers in premier journals
and conferences. He is a Senior Member of the IEEE Signal Processing
Society and a member of the ACM, SIGARCH, SIGDA, SIGBED, and
HiPEAC. He received the prestigious 2015 ACM/SIGDA Outstanding
New Faculty Award, six gold medals in educational career, and several
best paper awards and nominations at prestigious conferences, such
as DATE, DAC, ICCAD, and CODES+ISSS, the Best Master Thesis
Award, and the Best Lecturer Award. He served as the TPC Co-Chair of
ESTIMedia and LPDC, the General Chair of ESTIMedia, and the Track
Chair at DATE and FDL. He has given several invited talks, tutorials,
and keynotes. He has also organized many special sessions at premier
venues, such as DAC, ICCAD, DATE, and ESWeek, and served as the
Guest Editor for the IEEE Design and Test Magazine and the IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON SUSTAINABLE COMPUTING. He has served on
the program committees of several IEEE/ACM conferences, such as
ICCAD, ISCA, DATE, CASES, FPL, and ASPDAC.
